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ABSTRACT: During the past decade, several researchers have 
convincingly argued that, as a developed democracy, Israel ex- 
hibits a fairly clear pattern of electoral economic cycles. The 
present article questions some of the fundamental assumptions 
and 'political anthropologyn underlying this approach. Specifi- 
cally, it points to the crucial impact of long-term economic re- 
structuring and power realignment on the nature and outcome 
of electoral politics. The significance of these processes has be- 
come apparent mainly since the 1970s, with the transition from 
a growing economy dominated by a socialdemocratic govern- 
ment to a stagnating market dominated by large business groups. 
In the latter context, when there emerges a "consensus of dis- 
content" among the key business and labor coalitions, the gov- 
ernment is dethroned. 
Due to limitations in available data, this study must be re- 
garded as preliminary. Its hypothesis is tested against the two 
major electoral shifts, in 1977 and 1992. An alternative political- 
economic approach to the development of Israeli society, opposed 
to current political and economic paradigms, is presented. 
1. Introduction 
T HERE IS A CONSIDERABLE ACADEMIC LITERATURE dealing with Israeli politics. This literature can be divided roughly into two trends. One is more "structural," empha- 
sizing political structure and institutions, as well as the patterns 
created and transformed since the time of the British Mandate over 
Palestine. In this view, the old dominant political center was under- 
mined and eventually replaced by a "competitive systemn in which 
shifts of voters and parties along the "ideological axisn determine 
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the outcome of elections and the formation of coalition govern- 
ments (Horowitz and Lissak, 1989; Shapiro, 1980). The second 
approach is more "behavioral," stressing the electoral characteris- 
tics of voters. The focus is on demographic, ethnic and cultural 
changes and the way in which political parties are able to adapt 
themselves to the voter's will (Diskin, 1984; 1985). 
These approaches are founded on a paradigm that has devel- 
oped in the Israeli social sciences since the 1950s.' This paradigm 
may be summed up in two postulates: A) The "primordial sin" of 
Israeli politics is rooted in the authoritarian "socialist" or "statist" 
political culture of the East-European "founding fathers," who cre- 
ated a rigid "political center" and a "dominant party," seized con- 
trol of the economy and diminished private enterprise. In this way, 
a statist economy developed, consisting of heavy government in- 
tervention in key industries, and in capital and labor markets. This 
process was further enhanced by the Israeli-Arab conflict. 
B) Israeli society is a "sui generis" case; the historical determi- 
nants common to other developed societies do not apply to its 
historical experience. It is a classless society that never experienced 
a ruling class and did not pass through capitalist de~elopment.~ The 
socialclass perspective is therefore neglected in academic political 
analysis, which instead sees the political system as autonomous and 
contingent mainly on electoral choice and party alignment. In this 
context, the prevailing notion is that the current "democratization" 
of Israeli society, especially the growing "competitivenessn of the 
party system, strengthens the sovereignty of the voters and their 
capacity to influence politics. On the other hand, the economy is 
undergoing a process of "liberalization," "emancipation" from gov- 
ernment control. Thus, the government's power to influence elec- 
tions declines, while the impact of civic society grows. 
The purpose of this study is not to confront these traditional 
approaches directly, but rather to suggest an alternative, broader 
1 The essentials of this paradigm are to be found in manuals of Israeli political sociology 
and economics, e.g., Eisenstadt, 1967; Lissak, 1978; Ben-Porath, 1986. For a critique see 
Ram, 1993; 1994. 
2 Only two studies to date have been devoted to examination of electoral behavior from 
a classconsciousness perspective; both dealt with the reality of the late 1960s (Zloczower, 
1968; Yatziv, 1979). These works predicted the decline of the Labour movement; they 
did not, however, analyze the objective development of the power relation between capital 
and labor. These studies challenged the predominantly American functionalist theories 
and the "end of ideology" concept that prevailed in the Israeli social sciences. 
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analytical perspective. The argument is developed along two main 
lines. First, I focus on "electoral economic cycles" - a subject that 
combines economic and political processes. This direction is taken 
in order to break out from this narrow niche toward a more com- 
prehensive concept of Israel's political economy. Second, rather 
than stressing macroeconomic indicators or the behavior of the 
sovereign voter, I concentrate on the changes occurring within the 
dominant groups controlling politics and the economy. Without 
blurring the complex nature of these issues, I hope to offer an alter- 
native analysis emphasizing the political-economic aspects that have 
generally been ignored in most discussions of the subject. 
2. Electoral Economic Cycles 
In 1975, Ben-Porath published a short article in Kyklos, claim- 
ing that, using simple macroeconomic indicators - particularly 
changes in private consumption per capita - one could identify in 
Israel what he called a political business cycle. "Presumably," he 
wrote (Ben-Porath, 1975, 400), "if this cyclical behavior is induced 
by a desire to generate a feeling of well-being before elections, then 
private consumption is an indicator of what the politicians are 
indeed trying to affect." This alleged link between elections and 
government-induced macroeconomic fluctuations was endorsed by 
subsequent writers. Levi (1984), for example, pointed to cyclical 
patterns in real GNP per capita, employment and the real wage as 
indicators for such policy; Doron and Tamir (1983) focused on 
public spending as a policy tool to generate a feeling of well-being 
among voters; Ben-Hanan and Temkin (1986) emphasized exchange- 
rate policy and the government's impact on the real prices of sub- 
sidized commodities as a means of achieving similar ends. 
Several fundamental assumptions seem to characterize much 
of the literature on electoral economic cycles. First, most of these 
studies adopt the hedonic-rational framework, wherein a govern- 
ment that endeavors to maximize its votes and spoils (Doron and 
Tamir, 1983, 142) stands against voters who seek to maximize their 
consumption of private and public goods. The common presump 
tion is that, because voters are short-term optimizers, they tend to 
suffer from amnesia and myopia, and thus become susceptible to 
electoral economic policy (Alt and Chrystal, 1983, 104). In the in- 
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dustrial developed democracies, where the underlying parameters 
of scarcity and demand are relatively stable, this setting usually 
creates a permanent cyclical pattern of government-induced expan- 
sions and contractions (Frey and Schneider, 1981). 
A second tenet of this literature is the fairly rigid separation 
between "economics" and "politics." The economy is seen as a self- 
contained organism and government as an external force, gener- 
ally regarded as the main cause of economic distortion. Finally, most 
observers in this area, both in Israel and elsewhere, tend to con- 
centrate their attention on aggregate economic indicators. This 
preoccupation with overall macroeconomic performance pervades 
the descriptive and analytical literature alike (see for instance, the 
"reaction function" of Frey and Schneider, 1978). 
Unfortunately, these basic perceptions are potentially mislead- 
ing in a number of different ways. First, while the focus on short- 
term goals may be useful in explaining the re-election of a ruling 
party, it is not very revealing when we deal with dramatic electoral 
shifts, such as the ones occurring during the 1977 and 1992 elec- 
tions in Israel. This inherent limitation is acknowledged by Ben- 
Hanan and Temkin (1986), who found a progressive shortening of 
preelection economic upswings and wondered whether the 1977 
elections marked the "end of the electoral economic cycle in Israel" 
(23). Although their answer was negative, they also argued that there 
was most likely a broader transformation underlying the electoral 
economic cycle, which gradually altered the political rules of the 
game. Long-term economic and political changes slowly under- 
mined the dominant-party system, leading to a more intense multi- 
party competition and a forced shortening of electoral economic 
cycles. 
The second shortcoming of the electoral economic cycle ap- 
proach lies in its formalistic treatment of power. The emphasis is 
almost entirely focused on the relationship between the "voter" and 
the "government." Elections are primarily a competition over the 
rational votes of sovereign political consumers; since elections are 
seen as the ultimate essence of politics, it seems only natural to 
concentrate on the individual voter as the most basic unit or  even 
the building block of political research. In a way, this disregard of 
effective power relations resembles the choice of many neoclassi- 
cal economists who, in a world of giant oligopolies, remain pre- 
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occupied with individual rational consumers. A similar problem 
arises when, in the larger context of economic coalitions, one con- 
tinues to view the government as the ultimate center of power. In 
Israel, this view endows the government with an immense ability 
to intervene and distort economic performance. The "socialist" 
tradition, it is often argued, generated a bureaucratic-collectivist 
political culture (Eisenstadt, 1967), which instituted the supremacy 
of the political orientation over the business orientation (Shapiro, 
1977) and thus propagated the domination of politics over eco- 
nomic affairs (Arian, 1985, ch. 3). Electoral economics is then taken 
as evidence for the "demonic" power of the Israeli government, 
which works to harm economic performance and undermine its 
democratic basis (e.g., Aharoni, 1991, 12'7-31). Unfortunately, this 
view may not be very adequate for the Israeli case, at least not since 
the 1970s. 
As I see it, the neoclassical notion of market-like interaction 
between autonomous voters and omnipotent politicians serves to 
divert attention from a different, and perhaps far more important, 
relationship. The crucial political "determinant" may not be the 
preferences of political consumers, but rather the underlying struc- 
ture of politicaleconomic power. From this perspective, electoral 
politics is only part of a wider struggle ranging among the main 
power groups within the economy. According to Ferguson (1983, 
6), there is an increasing need for research along these latter lines. 
In his view, "it is high time to begin developing a different approach 
- a fresh account of political systems in which business elites, not 
voters, play the leading part; an account that treats mass party struc- 
tures and voting behavior as dependent variables" to be examined 
"in a context of class conflict and change within the business com- 
munity." 
Challenging Down's emphasis on individual utility and Olson's 
on group benefit, Ferguson suggests an "investment theory of polit- 
ical parties," an alternative approach that analyses changes in po- 
litical hegemony as part of a more fundamental transformation 
in the structure of economic power. The central issue is not how 
politicians interact with voters, but the changing role of government 
in the wider context of power coalitions. Instead of focusing on 
the way in which political parties sway the masses, we should look 
for those long-term economic processes that transform the struc- 
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ture of political power and alter the relative position of government 
within that structure. 
This leads us to the third weakness of the electoral economic 
cycle approach: its exclusive reliance on macroeconomic indicators. 
The difficulty with aggregate or average variables such as private 
consumption, government spending, taxes or subsidies is that they 
do not tell us much about the underlying processes of restructur- 
ing. For example, a rise in real private consumption per capita may 
serve to conceal a redistribution of income that makes one part of 
the population better off by worsening the living standard of the 
other part. Similarly, an increase in government spending may be 
the outcome of a decline in orders from one group of firms, 
coupled with a larger increase in procurement from the remain- 
ing  contractor^.^ 
Disaggregated indicators in fact are necessary if we are to gain 
a better understanding of long-term structural processes. In order 
to grasp the realignment of political power, we must start by look- 
ing into matters such as the distribution of income and wealth, the 
allocation of public spending, the relative burden of taxes, and the 
differential flow of government subsidies. The nature of these struc- 
tural changes may then help explain major shifts in the ideologies, 
creeds, and sentiments of the ruling elites, whose general "mood" 
trickles down through the various mass media and gets assimilated 
by the voting population (Ferguson, 1983,20-30). At the same time, 
one should not ignore all aggregate indicators, particularly those 
related to the labor market. Indeed, the very ability of the govern- 
ment to affect real wages and overall employment is, to a large 
extent, an indicator of its legitimacy and support among the key 
economic power groups. Given the crucial impact of these senti- 
ments on voting behavior, our task then is to explain their structural 
origin.4 To do that, we will first explore those long-term political- 
economic processes which, since the early 1970s, have altered the 
3 The potential significance of such conflicting developments is emphasized in Bichler and 
Nitzan (1994). 
4 It is of course true that no rigorous proof that meets the canons of a 'dynamic" expla- 
nation of a link between desires of the elites and voter decisions has ever been provided 
by 'elitist" theorists such as Ferguson, Domhoff (1979) or Abraham (1981). Neverthe- 
less, the growing number of 'structural" studies showing domination of the media by 
business elites are highly suggestive of the possiblity that such elites can exert signifi- 
cant impact on voting decisions. A short survey on the recent "elitist" studies will be 
found in Domhoff, 1990, ch. 1. 
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dominant ideologies and policies in the western countries, and then 
examine the relevance of such changes for the Israeli case. 
3. From Political Business Cycles to Political Trend 
The term "political business cycle" was first coined by Michal 
Kalecki, in his 1943 article on the "Political Aspects of Full Employ- 
ment." Explaining the role of democratic government in advanced 
capitalist economies, Kalecki observed a fundamental transforma- 
tion from the prewar period. Contrary to the early experience, when 
the emphasis was on the particular needs of business, the Great 
Depression convinced many governments of the need to actively 
regulate the overall level of economic activity. The main difficulty 
in achieving this goal arose from the objection of big business. 
While business leaders may agree to the use of expansionary policy 
as a means of preserving the legitimation of the regime, they 
strongly oppose any government attempt to maintain full employ- 
ment. Kalecki pointed out that, although higher employment may 
lead to higher profits, a commitment to full employment serves to 
undermine a far more important credo: the ideological hegemony 
of business enterprise. The crux of the matter, which big business 
leaders know all too well, is that their own dominance can be sus- 
tained only in the absence of any alternative method for efficient 
economic organization: 
"Discipline in the factories" and "political stability" are more appreciated 
by the business leaders than profits. Their class instinct tells them that 
lasting full employment is unsound from their point of view and that un- 
employment is an integral part of the normal capitalist system. (Kalecki, 
1971, 141.) 
As it turns out, then, governments in the postwar era were far from 
being autonomous. Caught between their conflicting needs to main- 
tain political legitimacy and for capital accumulation, these govern- 
ments were inevitably driven toward a political business cycle: 
. . . in the slump, either under the pressure of the masses, or  even without 
it, public investment financed by borrowing will be undertaken to prevent 
large-scale unemployment. But if attempts are made to apply this method 
in order to maintain the high level of employment reached in the subse- 
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quent boom a strong opposition of "business leaders" is likely to be en- 
countered. As has already been argued, lasting full employment is not at 
all to their liking. The workers would "get out of hand" and the "captains 
of industry: would be anxious to "teach them a lesson". . . . The pressure 
of all these forces, and in particular of big business would most probably 
induce the Government to return to the orthodox policy of cutting down 
the budget deficit. A slump would follow in which Government spending 
policy would come again into its own. (Ibid., 144.) 
Kalecki's theory of a political business cycle was adequate dur- 
ing the relatively prosperous period of the 1950s and 1960s when, 
in the context of overall growth, governments throughout the devel- 
oped West tended to follow a counter-cyclical stabilization policy. 
Since the early 1970s, however, there seems to have been a pro- 
found change in direction. Writing some 35 years after his friend 
Kalecki, Josef Steindl observed that 
. . . in the course of the 1970s we entered a new era, dominated by the 
conviction that in the future the long-term rate of growth is going to be 
much lower - or that it should be lower or must be lower - a belief which 
in the nature of things carries a great deal of self-fulfillment within it. 
(Steindl, 1979, 1, emphasis in the original.) 
While this "end of prosperity" was affected by a combination of 
factors, it was mainly the result of two related developments: the 
increasing internationalization of the advanced capitalist economies 
and the growing concentration of large-scale business enterprise. 
Together, these hndamental changes augmented the power of the 
large multinational corporations and weakened the relative efficacy 
of domestic government policies. With their progressive loss of 
vitality, government became decreasingly committed to stabilization 
and welfare policies. The growing power of large corporations was 
accompanied by a consistent decline in their relative share of tax 
payments. Labor was now burdened by an increasing share of the 
tax bill, combined with a continuous deterioration of public ser- 
v i c e ~ . ~  In Steindl's words: 
. . . the business opposition to full employment policies, which Kalecki 
had so vividly described in his analysis of the "political business cycle," 
5 The literature dealing with these trends is summarized in Foster, 1984, 140-46. 
POWER SHIFTS IN ISRAEL 423 
gathered more and more strength toward the end of the growth period. It 
seems to have now, however, a more persistent and lasting character than 
in Kalecki's political cycle, so that we might rather speak of a "political 
trend." (Steindl, 1979, 8.) 
By this "political trend," Steindl refers to the gradual abandon- 
ment of stabilization goals in favor of stagnation, or at best a "stunted 
growth" policy, limited social spending and persistently high levels 
of unemployment. In other words, during the 1970s the old post- 
war order of political business cycles gave way to a new regime. 
Instead of active fiscal policy and an ideology that placed govern- 
ment as a central actor, monetarism and the "free marketeers" 
called for an end to government intervention. The notion of an 
"overloaded government" was accompanied by a resurgence of free- 
market ideologies demanding abolition of the welfare state and 
acceptance of a "natural" rate of ~nemployment.~ A somewhat simi- 
lar politicaleconomic transition was also evident in Israel. In my 
view, it was this structural transformation which destabilized the 
electoral scene and led to the dramatic electoral shifts of 1977 and 
1992. 
4. The Restructuring of Israel's Political Economy 
At risk of some oversimplification, Israeli history may be char- 
acterized as a transformation from a growing economy dominated 
by a social democratic government, to a stagnating economy domi- 
nated by business elites. During the 20-year period between 1952 
and 1972, Israel enjoyed a rapid average growth rate of nine per- 
cent per annum. Much of this growth was induced by a substantial 
inflow of cheap capital, due mainly to unilateral transfers of repara- 
tions from Germany and from Jewish fundraising organizations. The 
bulk of this capital inflow was channelled through the government, 
enabling it to control the pace and nature of gross investment and 
capital formation. This, together with the expansion of government 
spending, particularly military expenditures associated with the 
Israeli-Arab conflict, made the Israeli government the country's 
pivotal economic power. In the Israeli political literature, this re- 
6 On the doctrine of 'overloaded government," see Huntington, 1975. For a critique of 
that doctrine, see Crouch, 1979, 14-16. 
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gime has often been characterized as a "dominant party system" 
(Arian and Barnes, 1974), a "party state," "corporatism" - or sim- 
ply the "Mapai system." This latter term denoted much more than 
the electoral superiority of the Mapai (Labour) Party. More broadly, 
it reflected the cohesiveness, self-confidence and spiritual hegemony 
of the ruling elites. 
At the time, the Israeli elites promoted social-democratic ide- 
ologies that had prevailed in Eastern Europe at the turn of the 
century, but the concrete historical context in which they operated 
involved a combination of a postwar welfare state and a managed 
war economy of "military Keynesianism." This modern institutional 
context of government intervention has slowly altered the structure 
of the Israeli economy. The growth of public spending and the 
expansion of the private sector were accompanied by a significant 
redistribution of income and concentration of wealth. Following 
the financial mergers of the 1950s and the industrial mergers of 
the 1960s, there emerged in Israel a "big economy" of corporate 
conglomerates and large firms, increasingly linked together through 
complex ownership ties, reciprocal business dealings and mutual 
relationships with the government.' The heavy recession in the mid- 
1960s intensified the concentration process and enabled the emerg- 
ing core group to diversify its holdings and increase the integra- 
tion of its component parts. 
Since the 1967 war, the recession was replaced by economic 
boom. The Israeli market suddenly expanded to include one mil- 
lion new consumers from the occupied territories. Moreover, the 
postwar years, roughly until 1973, saw a very rapid increase in the 
number of Palestinian employees working in Israel (about 70,000), 
and a consequent increase in purchasing power. This resulted in 
the further development of the corporate core, which by the early 
1970s already dominated all of the country's key industries and 
much of its financial sector.8 
To a large extent, the process of corporate concentration was 
accelerated by the pattern of capital allocation itself. In its selec- 
7 There is no space in this study for a full description of the development of the Israeli 
power elite. A more detailed account of its origins and development can be found in 
Frenkel and Bichler (1984). It is important to note that this subject has not yet been 
systematically studied by Israeli social scientists. 
8 The literature on core firms in the modem economy is examined and summarized in 
Bowring, 1986. The Israeli core corporations are described in Rowley, et al., 1988. 
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tive channeling of capital inflows, the government acted to promote 
certain business groups that were considered conducive to employ- 
ment growth and long-term economic independence. These pref- 
erences created an intricate system of mutual interrelationships 
among the political, business and military elites (Aharoni, 1976, 
ch. 7), which eventually manifested themselves in a new, more 
polarized pattern of income distribution. The backlash against this 
latter development was increased labor militancy; this culminated 
in a "wage explosion" and, since the late 1960s, began to under- 
mine the "Mapai system." With the unions' support no longer guar- 
anteed, the government shifted toward a business orientation in 
an attempt to break the autonomy of organized labour (Shalev, 
1992, ch. 5). The decline of the unions and the public sector was 
further accelerated by the rapid integration of Palestinian workers 
into the Israeli economy after 1967. 
Thus, business restructuring was accompanied by a parallel 
segmentation in the labor market. The first to analyze this segmen- 
tation was Farjoun (1980), who described the growing dichotomy 
between the "primary" and "secondary" labor markets. With the 
1967 occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the con- 
current militarization of the Israeli "big economy," writes Farjoun, 
". . . came a growing need for a cheap mobile labor force, with no 
social rights, a free labor force in the classical meaning of the term" 
(115). This was achieved by the proletarianization of the Palestin- 
ian population, which was rapidly becoming the main labor pool 
for a growing number of "small economy" sectors, such as agricul- 
ture, construction, services and low-technology civilian manufactur- 
ing. The other side of this process was that the "big economy," 
particularly its financial and military branches, came to rely solely 
on a Jewish, unionized labor force, with relatively extensive social 
security and wage rates twice as high as those earned by the Pales- 
tinians (ibid.). This injection of cheap labor boosted the "small 
economy" and promoted the ideology of free enterprise against the 
world-view of Keynesian intervention. 
The early 1970s were marked by the oil crises and the 1973 
war, but these events merely served to conceal the dawn of a new 
historical phase. Since the early 1970s, the political economy of 
Israel has been characterized by two principal developments: 1) the 
progressive consolidation of the dominant core corporations accom- 
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panied by the ongoing weakening of the government and the de- 
cline of the public sector; and 2) growing dependency on the United 
States and increasing subjugation of Israeli culture to the "Ameri- 
can capitalist ethos." 
The first of these developments is associated primarily with the 
evolution of the military and financial sectors in Israel (Bichler, 
1991). Indeed, much of the early emergence and subsequent con- 
solidation of the large core corporations was due to the expansion 
of military spending and the closely related increase in inf la t i~n.~ 
This process of concentration simultaneously reduced both excess 
capacity and competition, which in turn helped to maintain and 
even increase profit margins on lower volumes. On the other hand, 
the decline in the industrial "offset to savingsn diverted funds to 
the stock and bond markets, causing a rapid speculative increase 
in the volume of financial assets.1° With the prices of these assets 
rising even faster than the prices of goods and services, the ratio 
of stock market capitalization to GNP rose from less than eight 
percent in 1973 to 99% in 1982." The process of corporate con- 
centration and income redistribution slowly diminished the gov- 
ernment's economic power. During the earlier phase, the govern- 
ment assumed a leading role in agricultural planning, industrial 
policy, research and development, residential construction and 
civilian public services. With the rise of the "big economy," how- 
ever, it gradually retreated, initially into a position of a mere cata- 
lyst for venture capital and, eventually, into the role of a virtually 
passive financier. The 1977 rise of the Likud party, with its nationalist- 
military orientation and ardent opposition to economic planning, 
seems consistent with these tendencies. 
The second characteristic of the new, post-1970 phase arose 
when, following the end of the Vietnam war, the Middle East be- 
came the focus of attention for leading business interests in the 
United States, particularly those associated with petroleum and 
9 The relationship between inflation and the distribution of income and assets in Israel is 
examined in Alexander, 1978. 
10 Particularly affected were the assets of the core conglomerates: according to the report 
of the commission of inquiry dealing with the 1983 collapse of the stock market (Bejski, 
d aL, 1986, 61), shares of the three largest banks, which accounted for 7% of the aggre- 
gate value of all financial assets in 1973, rose to 44% of that total by 1982. 
11 Data on stock market capitalization are from the Bank of Israel (1974, 445; 1983, 282). 
The GNP figures are from the Central Bureau of Statistics, National Accounts 1972-1985, 
166. 
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arms. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Israeli government became 
increasingly dependent on civilian, but mainly military, assistance 
from the United States. This support served not only to keep Israel 
at the forefront of U. S. strategic interests in the region, but also 
to provide much needed contracts for the large U. S.-based cor- 
porations, which since Reagan were increasingly dependent on 
arms-related production (Rowley, et al., 1989). 
The growing dependence on the United States, together with 
the drastic restructuring of the Israeli economy, have altered not 
only the economic role of the Israeli government but also the 
country's dominant i'deologies. Much as Steindl (1979) described, 
the leading business groups in Israel and the United States began 
to demand that the Israeli government adopt a deliberate stagna- 
tion policy. The combination of stagflation, declining investment, 
growing domestic and foreign debts, expanding military budgets 
and restricted welfare services, which first appeared in the early 
1970s, became since the mid-1980s the accepted - and to some 
extent even desirable - order. Under the combined pressure of 
the large Israeli corporations and the U. S. administration, Israeli 
governments -both those led by Likud and those run by a "national- 
unity government" of Likud and Labour - embarked on a system- 
atic drive to cut wages, revert to regressive taxation, reduce civil- 
ian government spending, and abandon the capital market in favor 
of the large conglomerates. Particularly illuminating are the recent 
trends toward deregulation and privatization. For example, in re- 
laxing the investment rules for pension funds, the government has 
revoked its commitment to workers' pensions in order to allow the 
large conglomerates that manage those funds to use them as a 
source of financial leverage. At the same time, all recent govern- 
ments appear determined to maintain very high rates of interest 
in order to support the large banks. These banks almost collapsed 
in 1983 under the burden of their own speculation, and their on- 
going bailout worked to undermine the very survival of many in- 
dustrial and agricultural concerns. Finally, despite the backdrop of 
deteriorating public services and alarming increases in poverty,12 
governments during the 1980s continued to subsidize doubtful 
ventures in military technology (Bichler, 1991; Halperin, 1987), 
12 See for example National Insurance Institute, A n n u l  Survey, mainly the years 1987-91. 
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poured resources into the occupied territories, and started (partly 
under pressure from the U. S. administration) to privatize their 
extensive holdings. 
How did this broad transformation from the early era of eco- 
nomic growth and dominant social-democratic government to the 
subsequent regime of stagnation and dominant business elites affect 
the course of electoral politics? What was its impact on the pattern 
of election outcomes? How can it explain the sharp electoral rever- 
sals of 1977 and 1992? We now turn to these questions. 
5. Political Power Shifts: When Do They Occur? 
The long-term growth of the 1950s and 1960s ensured the dom- 
inance of the Labour Party. With cheap capital inflows, rising civil- 
ian (and, since the mid-1960s, military) spending, subsidized hous- 
ing and an interventionist industrial policy, the cultural and political 
hegemony of the Mapai government went practically unchallenged. 
In this context, "stop and go" electoral economics was a feasible 
and effective policy; it was accepted by the various elites and helped 
secure their continuous dominance. 
All of this started to change in the early 1970s, with the pre- 
carious combination of stagnation and restructuring. On the one 
hand, the polarization of income and growing unemployment 
tended to alienate the large unions while, on the other, the fiscal 
crisis of the government and the ensuing stagnation made it increas- 
ingly difficult to sustain the increases in profits that the large con- 
glomerates had come to expect. Under these antagonistic condi- 
tions, the labor and business coalitions began to lose some of their 
self-confidence and question their commitment to existing institu- 
tional arrangements. Different groups pulled in different directions, 
which made the government's political "juggling" ever more deli- 
cate and the electoral outcome increasingly uncertain. However, 
when these negative sentiments happened to coincide - that is, 
when there emerged a "disappointment consensus" among both 
the key labor unions and business elites - the government lost 
power. I believe that this is what happened when the Likud first 
came to power in 1977, and then, later, when it was defeated by 
Labour in 1992. 
This hypothesis is not easy to substantiate with available Israeli 
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data. Ideally, we would need to relate the temporal course of elec- 
toral politics to key disaggregated variables that reflect the relative 
positions and "moods" of the various elites; unfortunately, such data 
rarely exist. For instance, the relative position of the large conglom- 
erates is greatly affected by changes in their institutional arrange- 
ments with the government; but how can these arrangements be 
assessed when even their most rudimentary aspects - such as the 
size distribution of taxes, subsidies or government contracts - are 
not publicly known? Also, unlike in many other developed coun- 
tries, Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics does not estimate the 
national accounts from the income side. As a result, we have no 
official statistics on the size distribution of profit, and even the 
overall magnitude of business income is estimated only indirectly. 
Similarly, if we are to observe shifts in the labor arena, we need 
information on net (as opposed to pre-tax) wages, as well as on the 
distribution of labor income; again, unfortunately, these data do 
not exist in Israel.13 
In spite of these difficulties we may identify three important 
similarities between the 1977 defeat of the Labour government and 
the 1992 fall of Likud. 
First, in both cases the pre-election years show a marked dete- 
rioration in the profit position of the "big economy."14 Prior to the 
1970s, when the economy was still dominated by a Keynesian gov- 
ernment, the large corporate groups were only at their formative 
stage and their profits were still relatively low. From the early 1970s 
onward, however, these large firms started to emerge as a leading 
economic power and their net profits began to grow rapidly, in both 
absolute terms and as a share of total business income. This rapid 
growth ended in the mid-1980s and then reverted to a decline, 
which continued into the early 1990s (see Rowley, et al., 1988). From 
1974 to 1976, profits of the large holding groups declined by 
approximately nine percent annually. This period saw a cessation 
of GNP growth for the first time since 1966. Between 1984 and 
1991 there was a persistent decline in profits of the "big econ- 
omy," especially in the years 1990-91. These last years were ex- 
13 For a critical review of economic data in Israel, see Bichler, 1991, ch. 4. 
14 The profits of the Big Economy combine the net profits of Israel's five largest conglom- 
erates: Leumi group, Hapoalim group, IDB, Koor, and Clal. The data are based on the 
companies' consolidated reports and are expressed in constant prices. A detailed analy- 
sis of the financial performance of the big economy is given in Rowley, et al., 1988. 
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perienced with particular severity by the business elite, whose 
expectations had been temporarily raised in 1989 by a brief spurt 
of growth. 
From this follows the second similarity, involving domestic 
military purchases. With the emergence of chronic stagnation since 
the mid-1970s, the profits of the big economy became increasingly 
dependent on financial activity and military production.I5 Domes- 
tic military procurement grew rapidly from the mid-1960s until its 
peak in 1974 - a period that also saw the most rapid consolida- 
tion of the big economy. Between 1969 and 1974, domestic mili- 
tary procurement grew at an annual rate of 14%. As a share of GNP 
this indicator stood at about three percent in the early 1960s, and 
reached a peak of 13% during the 1973 war. The subsequent period, 
until the 1977 dethronement of the Labour government, witnessed 
a sharp decline in these expenditures, at an annual rate of 8.5%.16 
Since 1977, however, under the new Likud regime, domestic mili- 
tary procurement resumed its upward trend, which continued until 
the 1982-83 war in Lebanon. 
From 1984 to 1990, real arms purchases remained at a more ' . 
or less steady level. But overall military sales continued to rise with 
the growth of heavily subsidized military exports. Since 1991, how- 
ever, military exports began to decline, and a serious concern arose 
among the elites regarding the somber prospects for world mili- 
tary sales. The relaxation of superpower rivalry, the demise of the 
Soviet Union, and the outcome of the Gulf War, which left Israel 
out of the winning coalition, have signaled the diminishing impor- 
tance of Israel's strategic position to the United States. These fac- 
tors have all converged to generate a sense of apprehension in the 
Israeli military-industrial complex. 
The apparent downward rigidity of military spending through- 
out the 1980s and early 1990s - a rigidity that persisted despite 
growing public calls for cutbacks - serves to demonstrate the piv- 
15 The impact of military spending on the profits of the big economy and on the process 
of aggregate concentration in Israel are analyzed econometrically in Bichler and Nitzan, 
1994. 
16 The data are based on the National Accounts of the Central Bureau of Statistics, vari- 
ous years. For discussion of the feasibility of this data see, e.g., Berglas, 1983. In Israel 
there is no systematic information about the distribution of contract awards; neverthe- 
less we can assume that the bulk of domestic military contracts flows to the big economy 
(as many unofficial indicators seem to suggest); see, e.g., Bichler and Nitzan, 1994. 
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otal political position of the large corporations. At the same time, 
the pressures to curtail the military economy, together with the 
decline of inflationary speculation, bore heavily on the profits of 
the big economy. During the late 1980s, many leading firms - and 
most notably, the country's largest industrial concern, Koor - started 
to crumble, and that must have undermined the self-confidence of 
the business elites. 
Although the government was increasingly attuned to the de- 
mands of big business, its ability to further increase this sector's 
profits was evidently limited. Moreover, during that time, the busi- 
ness elites grew anxious about Israel's deteriorating relationships 
with the U. S. Administration, as highlighted by repeated revela- 
tions such as the Pollard affair, the Iran-Contra scandal and the 
Dotan affair. Over the years, the large Israeli conglomerates became 
increasingly dependent on U. S. military and civilian assistance 
(Cockburn and Cockburn, 1991), as well as on the intricate set of 
business relationships with the large U. S. armament corporations 
- a dependency that was now increasingly endangered by the ap- 
parent inflexibility of Likud's foreign policy. The souring of rela- 
tions with the United States also ran counter to the long-term assimi- 
lation of American values by Israeli elites, particularly the "business 
ethos." 
This reference leads to the third similarity, since in both 1977 
and 1992 there was growing uneasiness about Israel's relationship 
with the United States. The 1974-7'7 Rabin government first clashed 
with the Ford Administration over the peace talks with Egypt, and 
then with the Carter Administration over Palestinian self-rule. This 
latter conflict even led to an American "reevaluation" of its mili- 
tary assistance to Israel (Gazit, 1983). 
However, for these negative business sentiments to affect the 
electoral outcome they had to coincide with a broader atmosphere 
of discontent in the labor market; indeed, both electoral reversals 
were preceded by severe setbacks for the labor unions. The 1960s 
were marked by a period of relative prosperity, supported first by 
the German payments and then by the post-1967 War boom. Since 
the mid-1970s, however, Israel entered a period of "stunted growth." 
The Rabin government of 1974-77 adopted a contractionary policy 
aimed at increasing exports and improving the balance of payments. 
The policy included cuts in government capital formation, an effort 
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to reduce real wages and a move towards more regressive taxation. 
The outcome was clear: unemployment rose 50% between 1973 and 
1977. Real wages stopped rising after a long period of continuous 
increase going back to the beginning of the 1960s (between 1969 
and 1973 real wages had risen 3.4% annually).17 
The Begin government, which came into office in 1977, em- 
barked on an expansionary policy of inflationary finance and for- 
eign borrowing; this lowered the rate of unemployment and in- 
creased both profits and labor income. These developments were 
short-lived, however. Since the early 1980s, there has been a per- 
sistent tendency (with short-term fluctuations) toward higher un- 
employment, and which was further augmented by wage erosion 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s (both of these developments 
were intensified during the 1989-91 period by the massive immi- 
gration from the former Soviet Union).18 The stagnation became 
particularly severe after 1985, when the "unity government" of 
Likud and Labour launched its "stabilization policy." The plan in- 
cluded high real rates of interest (up to 40%), cuts in civilian spend- 
ing and transfers (particularly social programs), reduction in mar- 
ginal tax rates for high-income earners and a growing reliance on 
indirect taxes and levies, privatization, and support for foreign in- 
vestment. Subsidies for agriculture were cut back and income of 
the whole sector, cooperative (Kibbutzim and Moshavim) and pri- 
vate, declined drastically. The sword of privatization now hangs over 
the head of key large government firms: Israel Aircraft Industry (the 
biggest Israeli arms producer), Bezek (the communication giant), 
and Israel Chemical (the leading Israeli exporter). 
These trends have generated growing anxiety among the unions, 
especially given the rapid increase in the rate of unemployment 
since 1987, and the decline in real wage rates since 1989. (In this 
context, the immigration from the Soviet Union, which might other- 
wise have acted as an economic stimulus, only contributed to a 
Data on the rate of unemployment is based on the Slatistical Abstract of Israel, various 
years, chapters on "Labor and Wages." The average real wage is computed by dividing 
the "average monthly wage per employee post" (before taxes) by the annual CPI. 
Unemployment rose continuously from 2.3% in 1979 - with the exception of some pre- 
election token decreases - to almost 12% in 1992. The trend in real wages was steadily 
upward from 1977 to 1988 (with the exception of 1985, the year of 'stabilization policy"). 
This trend was reversed between 1989 and 1992, when real wages decreased at an annual 
rate of 6.5%. 
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further rise in unemployment and stronger downward pressure on 
wages.) The adverse evolution of unemployment and real wages 
again points to an important similarity between the fall of Labour 
in 1977 and the defeat of Likud in 1992. In particular, both elec- 
tions were preceded by a few years of adverse trends in the key 
variables of the labor market. In other words, prior to these two 
elections there arose a "consensus of discontent" among the vari- 
ous elites. For the business coalitions, lower profits, falling military 
sales, and an antagonistic foreign policy signified a challenge to their 
leading role, while for the big unions, permanent high unemploy- 
ment and lower wages spelled mass discontent and loss of authority. 
In this context, it is necessary to consider the impact of the 
"Palestinian problem" and the intifada (uprising), which broke out 
in the occupied territories since 1988. Contrary to conventional 
wisdom, both leading parties - Likud and Labour (and actually 
most of the Zionist parties, including the major parts of the cur- 
rent Meretz - have not recognized the Palestinian right to an in- 
dependent state. As a matter of fact, the Palestinian question has 
never been a direct issue in electoral campaigns. The difference 
between the two major parties concerning the Palestinian question 
was merely tactical. The occupation itself was economically prof- 
itable, while its costs were relatively negligible (maintenance of a 
small army and "Shabak" - General Security Service - force with 
minimal legitimation expenses). However, since the 1990s, the 
Israeli elite has started to lose its self-confidence, as it has become 
apparent that the occupation authorities have lost control and that 
terrorist activities have been spreading and endangering personal 
security within the "green line." The elite's despair rapidly shifted 
the collective mood and led to a search for a non-controversial 
authoritative figure who represented the "old values." The com- 
bined weight of these sentiments projected itself forcefully onto 
the voting population and likely contributed to a change of gov- 
ernment. 
6. Summary and Conclusiom 
In this work, I have argued that the customary approach of 
electoral economic cycles may not be sufficient to explain sharp 
political reversals, such as the 1977 defeat of the Labour govern- 
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ment, or the 1992 dethronement of Likud. Belief in a sovereign, 
rational, utility-maximizing voter does not seem consistent with 
observed behavior, such as the fact that - despite a 400% rate of 
inflation, rising unemployment, the loss for many people of life- 
time savings in the stock-market crash and the costly military en- 
tanglement in Lebanon - a full third of the voting population still 
chose to vote Likud in the 1984 elections. Moreover, since the 
19 '70~~ Israeli governments found it increasingly hard to run effec- 
tive "election economics" campaigns, a fact that further diminishes 
the explanatory power of electoral economic cycles. 
My own approach in this paper has been to focus not on cases 
of reelection, but on those instances in which the government lost 
power. These drastic reversals point to fundamental processes of 
politicaleconomic restructuring, processes that are often ignored 
in the electoral literature but have a profound impact on political 
outcomes. Specifically, I have argued that the two cases in which 
the Israeli government failed in a bid for reelection arose from a 
coincidence of discontent among the business elite and key labor 
unions. 
These reversals, however, became possible only since the 1970s, 
after the culmination of some important changes in the underlying 
structure of the Israeli economy. Israeli history involved a profound 
structural transition from a regime of economic growth with a 
dominant Labour government, to an era of stunted growth in which 
business elites assume the leading role. The first period, lasting 
roughly until the early 1970s, was marked by growing population, 
rising real GNP per capita, expanding public services and rising 
military spending.lg With the inflow of cheap foreign capital, the 
Labour government enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy 
and cultural hegemony; this enabled and legitimized an effective 
"on and off" economic policy before and after elections. This pro- 
cess, which resembled Kalecki's "political business cycle," began to 
disappear with the growth of the "big economy" since the early 
19'70s. The rise of the large conglomerates, together with the in- 
creasing dependence of Israel on the United States, undermined 
19 This resembles in some sense the claim by Gold (1977) that, after the Second World 
War, there emerged in the United States a "Keynesian coalition" among the big economy, 
the large labor unions and the government to prevent stagnation via increases in mili- 
tary spending. 
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the relative power position of the government and brought about 
a substantial change in dominant ideologies. 
In the political literature, this change is often described as a 
shift from a "dominant party system" to a "competitive party sys- 
tem" (Arian, 1977; Shapiro, 1980). The customary notion is that 
this transformation arose when demographic, ethnic, religious or 
nationalistic changes altered the political preferences of the voting 
population. By focusing solely on the electoral form of the system, 
this view fails to recognize the profound change in its political- 
economic essence: the decline and delegitimation of the political 
elite itself and the ascendancy of a political power alignment that 
established a new political order. It  is noteworthy that proponents 
of the customary view overlook what might be called the "democ- 
ratization paradox," according to which the increase in the level of 
competition among political parties has taken place side by side 
with the monopolization of the economy. In other words, a reverse 
tendency exists between increasing economic concentration, on the 
one hand, and the decline of the "dominant party system" and the 
end of Labour hegemony, on the other. This evaluation implies that 
Israel is perhaps not a special case after all, and suggests that an 
alternative theoretical perspective emphasizing social class and the 
process of capitalization may go a long way toward explaining its 
political development. 
Since the 1970s, Keynesian interventionism has given way to 
the new-old ideology of free enterprise, including acceptance of a 
"natural" rate of unemployment and stunted growth. Under these 
conditions, the political arena becomes increasingly unstable and 
"competitive." Although the government is called upon to "take its 
hands off the economy," it must still respond to the plight of the 
various power coalitions. This need to both promote accumulation 
in the big economy and maintain legitimation with the labor unions 
involves a very delicate balancing act, which is made even more 
difficult by the weaker economic position of the government. The 
Rabin government of 1977 and the Shamir government of 1992 
failed in that task. Both governments faced growing discontent 
among all the important elites and key unions and, with these nega- 
tive sentiments projected forcefully through the various mass media, 
they both fell. 
Here, we come to the final point concerning the structural 
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change taking place in the 1990s. In recent years, the Israeli elites 
have faced the reality of the "new world order." The globalization 
of big business and the increase of world competitiveness cast doubt 
on the expediency of a state of "permanent war economy" for 
Israel's big economy. More important, the international market for 
armaments has entered a new period of contraction and cutthroat 
competition in which Israeli companies will find it hard to gain or 
even retain market share.20 Those who want to survive must realign 
themselves with international investors, which see Israel as a spring- 
board for regional business. Also, the Israeli conglomerates discov- 
ered that the international market, especially the emerging coun- 
tries, offer great potential - but this depends upon removing the 
Arab boycott, which in turn is considerably dependent upon set- 
tling the Palestine-Israel conflict. In short, war has become an eco- 
nomic burden, both to the multinational corporations seeking to 
enter the region, and to their domestic counterparts who wish to 
ride the tide. Thus, since the rise of the Rabin regime the so-called 
"peace dividend" process began. This process, while largely stimu- 
lated by American intervention in the Middle East, encouraged the 
Rabin government to settle the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which 
had become a burden, and to move towards a competitive economy 
integrated into the rest of the Middle East. This kind of integra- 
tion in the new capitalist order led the Rabin regime to confront 
both the unions and the nationalistic right. The Rabin government 
is taking drastic measures in order to cut wages and social services, 
to maintain a high rate of unemployment and to destroy the unions. 
On the other hand, the government is receiving support from the 
business elites and from the business sector at large, which profits 
from the recent upward trend in the stock market and tax-free 
capital gains. The three main centers of opposition most injured 
by this demilitarization-oriented neo-liberal policy - the unem- 
ployed and low-wage workers, the clerical right and the settlement 
movement, and the unions representing employees of large indus- 
trial firms - are unlikely to be able to unite against this trend. Thus, 
20 It is interesting to note that, while domestic military spending has declined in the last 
two years, military imports (supported by American grants) have not. If this continues, 
the Israeli contractors will eventually be forced to transform themselves into subsidiar- 
ies of their American counterparts (Tediran, one of the leading contractors, became in 
the last decade a considerable subcontractor of American arms suppliers). 
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as long as Rabin manages to maintain solid relations with the U. S. 
Administration, integrating Israeli business into the Middle East- 
ern "Pax Americana," he will not need to implement any drastic 
measures, aside from formulating a short term "electoral econom- 
ics policy" before the coming elections. 
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